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The question of the scope of public employee free speech rights is of obvious 
importance.  Such cases are frequently litigated.1  The speaker’s continuing 
employment is commonly at stake.  The appropriate functioning of the 
government agency may be at issue as well.  But government agencies are 
intended to operate not only with internal efficiency, but with proper 
accountability to the public.  And such accountability requires an appropriate 
degree of agency openness, transparency, and meaningful disclosure on publicly 
significant matters.  Adequately assuring the democratic accountability of 
government agencies, it turns out, requires greater protection of public employee 
speech than is currently available. 
This Article takes a close look at the current federal constitutional free speech 
rights of government employees, in so far as such speech may be subject to 
discipline by the government employer in question.  Crucially, the current 
judicial test for the scope of such rights tries to distinguish speech made in one’s 
role as a public employee from speech made in that person’s role as a citizen, 
relying in turn upon various non-equivalent, non-exhaustive, multi-factor tests.2  
The courts thus attempt, in effect, to artificially divide the speaker into two 
separate and distinct personas, that of public employee, and that of citizen. 
The courts then ask various alternative sets of questions as to, for example, 
whether the speech in question should be characterized as within the scope of 
the speaker’s genuine job responsibilities; or pursuant to, or in the course of 
employment; or owing its existence to, or otherwise caused by, the speaker’s 
government employment.  An affirmative answer to any of these inquiries flatly 
dooms the speaker’s free speech claim at the very start, with no other 
circumstance then being taken into account.3 
 
 + Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
 1. Westlaw listed 3,751 federal court citations to the leading case as of April 27, 2020. 
 2. See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 44–64 and accompanying text. 
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Often, this gate-keeper inquiry as to speaker-role is thought to focus on any 
relation between the public employee’s speech and the employee’s “chain of 
command” within the government agency in question.4  But this focus turns out, 
in practice, to be no more generally useful than any number of alternative 
approaches to implementing the current constitutional test.5  Instead, the diverse 
judicial approaches to public employee speech generate a disturbing series of 
ironies, paradoxes, incongruities, and counterintuitive results.6 
This gate-keeper speaker-role inquiry thus relies upon an often crude and 
artificial attempt to divide the speaker into a public employee as distinct from a 
citizen.  The crucial problem here is that government employees differ precisely 
in their outlook, values, beliefs, and motivations with respect to their obligations 
as democratic citizens.7 
A democratic system of government, if it is to be meaningful, requires certain 
sustaining attitudes, behaviors, practices, and institutions, particularly with 
respect to well-grounded government employee speech on matters relating to 
responsive, open, transparent, and accountable democratic government.8  A 
meaningful democracy thus requires, in particular, broad public employee free 
speech rights. 
As it turns out, the relationship between a properly functioning democracy 
and a broader compass for public employee well-grounded free speech is 
reciprocal.  For true, or at least responsibility-grounded, public employee 
speech, greater free speech rights tend to advance democracy.  And while free 
speech rights promote democratic accountability, freedom of speech conceived 
of as well as promoting either the search for truth, or else as promoting self-
realization and genuine9 personal autonomy, similarly tend to promote 
democratic institutions and values as well.10 
 
 4. See infra notes 66–77 and accompanying text. 
 5. See generally Section I infra. 
 6. See infra notes 86–106 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 117–126 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 127–142 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 143–150 and accompanying text. 
 10. For a range of perspectives on the scope and limits of government employee free speech 
rights, see generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. 
REV. 301 (2016); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 
1007 (2005); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A 
Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008); Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad 
as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631 (2012); Adam 
Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 
1 (2013). 
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I. SPEAKING AS A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE AS SUPPOSEDLY OPPOSED TO SPEAKING 
AS A CITIZEN 
The cases have made at least passing reference to a purported distinction 
between speaking as a public employee and speaking as a citizen for some 
time.11  Only more recently, however, has the Court focused on this distinction 
as a functional, and indeed often decisive, gate-keeping element of public 
employee free speech cases.12 
The crucial case in this regard, Garcetti v. Ceballos,13 has been frequently 
cited.14  The logic of Garcetti will be central to much that follows below.  The 
Garcetti majority opinion is multi-faceted and complex.  For the moment, 
though, we can say simply that Garcetti explicitly imposes a distinctive speaker-
role requirement if even the mere possibility of free speech protection for a 
public employee speaker is to remain open.  Crucially, the speech must have 
been made in the speaker’s role, or capacity, as a citizen,15 as explicitly distinct 
from that speaker’s role, or capacity, as a government employee.16 
After Garcetti, speaking not as a government employee but instead as a citizen 
is a gatekeeping or threshold requirement for any possible free speech 
protection.  Pursuant to prior case law17 and to Garcetti itself, there would then 
remain two further hurdles the speaker must then clear. 18 The first such hurdle 
requires a showing by the speaker that the speech in question addressed a matter 
of public interest or concern, as distinct from a matter of merely private or 
personal concern.19  Without such a showing, free speech protection even for a 
public citizen is generally unavailable.20  The final hurdle then involves an 
interest balancing test.21 
 
 11. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983). 
 12. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–26 (2006). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Westlaw listed 3,936 total case citations and 3,500 secondary source citations to Garcetti 
as of April 13, 2020. 
 15. Or, presumably, as an alien.  See generally R. George Wright, Undocumented Speakers 
and Freedom of Speech: A Relatively Uncontroversial Approach, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 499 (2009). 
 16. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–26. 
 17. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 11. 
 18. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19. 
 19. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 
205, 391 U.S. 563 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).  For discussion, see 
infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 20. See authorities cited supra note 19. 
 21. As classically, but too narrowly, formulated, “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the [speaker], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417 (quoting Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 568.  The reference to “any case” is only to cases that survive the earlier steps under Connick 
and Garcetti. 
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There is much to explore in the entire Garcetti case.  However, it is more 
useful to consider the issues and problems that flow from Garcetti’s initial 
threshold role-requirement, under which the speech must have occurred in the 
speaker’s role as a citizen, and not as a public employee.22  The best source for 
some initial sense of these issues and problems is the case law that has sought to 
interpret and implement Garcetti’s distinction in this respect. 
Probably the most authoritative interpretation of Garcetti is found in the 
Court’s own later case of Lane v. Franks.23  Lane seeks to clarify Garcetti in at 
least one context.  In particular, Lane holds that 
 [t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the 
scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First 
Amendment purposes.  That is so even when the testimony relates to 
his public employment or concerns information learned during that 
employment.24 
Lane thus clarifies the Garcetti speaker-role inquiry in one quite specific 
context.  But merely reiterating the purported distinction between speech as a 
public employee and speech as a citizen does not do much to clarify the 
distinction itself. 
In fact, Lane seems to focus not on the full scope of a public employee’s job 
responsibilities, which may occasionally include the extraordinary, but more 
narrowly on the employee’s “ordinary” job responsibilities.25  Thus, it is 
currently unclear whether truthful testimony under oath, perhaps even pursuant 
to subpoena, can qualify for possible free speech protection for those for whom 
such testimony is somehow determined to be within the scope of their “ordinary” 
job responsibilities.26  Broadly speaking, then, Lane does not attempt to more 
usefully clarify the Garcetti speech-role holding, and may even add further 
complications thereto. 
The problems created by the Garcetti speech-role distinction begin with the 
question of who is to determine any such issue in any given case.  There are 
broad legal and public policy implications of issues of free speech and 
administrative effectiveness, so it is not surprising that some courts have treated 
public employee speech issues, including speaker-role issues, as questions of 
law.27  But speaker-role issues seem as well to often require consideration of 
 
 22. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–26. 
 23. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
 24. Id. at 238; see also Lett v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 
Lane, 573 U.S. at 238). 
 25. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2017); Boulton v. 
Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 26. See authorities cited supra note 25; Bott v. Bradshaw, 791 F. App’x 41, 45 (11th Cir. 
2019) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (“[O]ne of [the speaker’s] essential job duties entailed 
providing testimony regarding her investigation of and interaction with criminal defendants.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 618 (11th Cir. 2015); see also 
the references to Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Court opinions in Mayhew. Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 
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questions of fact, including what a public employee was realistically required to 
do on a recurring basis.  So, it is also not surprising that other courts have treated 
speaker-role issues as mixed questions of law and fact.28  This entirely 
understandable circuit split amounts to one of the avoidable costs of undertaking 
the speaker-role inquiry in the first place. 
On the merits, then, of Garcetti’s speaker-role elements, the courts 
acknowledge at least that “determining if an employee is speaking as a private 
citizen ‘can be challenging.’”29  Plainly, this issue “is not susceptible to a bright 
line rule.”30  Of course, some plainly useful legal tests are, to one degree or 
another, not reducible to clear, bright line status.  How much murkiness and 
indeterminacy we should tolerate in a legal test should depend not only on the 
degree of such murkiness and indeterminacy, but as well on how uniquely useful 
the test in question really is.  A test that adds little real constitutional value to 
the overall determination should be dispensed with.  And a test that tends in 
some instances to misconstrue or even impair the constitutional values at stake 
should be dispensed with all the more readily. 
Even the Court itself in Garcetti recognized, to begin with, that many speaker-
role cases involve multiple factors tugging in opposite directions, toward an 
employee speaker-role and as well toward a citizen speaker-role, respectively.31  
Worse, though, the Court has also acknowledged that in a particular case, a 
public employee may speak, simultaneously, as both a public employee and as 
“a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of 
his government.”32  This sort of mixed-motive case impliedly concedes, at a 
minimum, that the speaker-role status need not be dichotomous, or binary.33 
More typically, though, the courts do treat speaker-role questions as though 
they were inevitably binary, but often complex.  Thus, the courts have often 
adopted one version or another of an admittedly non-exhaustive multi-factor test 
 
462.  The Sixth Circuit has broadly declared that “whether a public employee’s speech is protected 
is a question of law for the courts to decide.”  Haddad v. Gregg, 910 F.3d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462–64).  At the state court level, see Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire 
Dep’t, 409 P.3d 160, 174 (Wash. 2018). 
 28. See the references to Third, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Court opinions in Mayhew. 
Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462; see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1233 
(W.D. Wash. 2020). 
 29. See Jones v. Wilson Cnty., 723 F. App’x 289, 292 (6th Cir. 2018) (unpublished opinion) 
(quoting Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464)). 
 30. Waronker v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 788 F. App’x 788, 791 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(unpublished opinion) (quoting Ross v. Breslin, 693 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2012)); Montero v. City 
of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 397 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ross, 693 F.3d at 306). 
 31. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006). 
 32. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
8 v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174–75 (1976)). 
 33. Mixed speaker motive cases are presumably common.  It would hardly be surprising if 
some single instance of speech reflected, to one degree or another, both one’s role as a government 
employee and one’s role as a concerned citizen.  See, e.g., Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 292–93 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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for speaker role-status.34  These multi-factor tests vary in their focus and 
formulation. 
As a mere sampling of the varied multi-factor speaker-role tests, consider, for 
example, the Sixth Circuit’s focus, among other factors, on “the speech’s 
impetus; its setting; its audience;35 and its general subject matter—‘who, where, 
what, when, why, and how’ considerations.”36  Alternatively, the Eleventh 
Circuit focuses on “the employee’s job description, whether the speech occurred 
at the workplace, and whether the speech concerned the subject matter of the 
employee’s job.”37  Or consider the Third Circuit’s declaration that “[w]hether 
an individual spoke as an employee requires examination of the content, form, 
and context of the relevant speech.”38 
Remarkably, this latter formulation is also precisely how the Court has 
characterized the supposedly quite different judicial inquiry into whether the 
speech in question addresses a matter of public interest and concern or not.39  
Thus some courts decide the speaker-role question under Garcetti with precisely 
the same formal legal test used for whether the speech at issue addresses a matter 
of public interest and concern or not.40  This in itself impeaches the claim that 
Garcetti’s speaker-role inquiry adds distinct, otherwise unattainable 
constitutional value to the pre-existing tests for public employee freedom of 
speech.  The speaker-role inquiry would, at best, be largely redundant. 
Of course, other multi-factor tests for speaker-role do not, on their face, 
merely duplicate portions of other aspects of public employee free speech tests.41  
But then, we are left with a variety of alternative multi-factor balancing tests, 
 
 34. See, e.g., Haddad, 910 F.3d at 246–47 (citing Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464); Mayhew, 856 
F.3d at 464 (citing Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2012); see also 
King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Alves v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir. 2015)).  See also Plouffe v. 
Cevallos, 777 F. App’x 594, 603 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished opinion). 
 35. The ‘audience’ for the speech will, by way of further complication, consist of an 
immediate audience, perhaps an official questioner, and anyone else in the room.  But there may 
also be a much broader, indirectly targeted audience, consisting of, for example, remote 
government officials, journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens.  The possible complications are 
apparently endless. 
 36. Haddad, 910 F.3d at 246–47 (quoting Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464). 
 37. Alves, 804 F.3d at 1161 (citing Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 618 (11th 
Cir. 2015)).  As noted at various points below, each of these factors invites further important 
qualifications and distinctions. 
 38. Plouffe, 777 F. App’x at 603 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987)). 
 39. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384–85; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384–85; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983); 
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004); Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014).  Of 
course, an inquiry into the speech’s “content, form, and context” could vary in its course and 
meaning in the two very different judicial inquiries, but the overlap should typically be quite 
substantial. 
 41. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
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post-Garcetti, that cannot be translated into, or somehow reduced to, one 
another. 
To further complicate matters, there are also a number of perhaps non-decisive 
single-factor guides to deciding whether a given speech was uttered as a public 
employee or else as a citizen.  Not surprisingly, these single-factor guides 
generally do not claim to be exhaustive, or invariably sufficient even where they 
would apply.  Consider, to begin with, the suggestion that one relevant factor is 
“whether the speech was made inside or outside of the workplace.”42  The aim 
here is likely to replace the vague idea of the scope of one’s employment, 
ordinary or otherwise, with a simpler, largely visual or geographic inquiry.  One 
problem, though, is that this test, focusing on a physical workplace, is ill-suited 
to an era of cyber communications and working from home.43 
But more basically, the mere physical location of one’s speech, in or outside 
of one’s physical workspace, can hardly be a reliable guide to whether one’s 
speech fell within the scope of one’s legitimately described job responsibilities.  
Some speech within the workplace is clearly unrelated to one’s job.44  Thus it 
has been claimed that “[m]erely because an employee’s speech was made at 
work and about work does not necessarily remove that employee’s speech from 
the ambit of constitutional protection.”45  And on the other hand, a government 
employee’s core job responsibilities may often carry that party outside of their 
physical workplace, and into much more broadly used public or private spaces.46 
A bit even less manageable single-factor consideration contrasts speech that 
“is itself ordinarily47 within the scope of an employee’s duties”48 with employee 
speech that “merely concerns those duties.”49  The line between speech within 
the scope of one’s duties and speech merely concerning or addressing one’s 
duties is at best dubious.  Many jobs, for example, will require the employee to 
 
 42. Henderson v. City of Flint, 761 F. App’x 618, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hand-Clay 
v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
 43. See Catie Edmondson & Katie Benner, After Days of Anxiety and Confusion, Government 
Workers Told to Stay Home, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/un/ 
politics/coronavirus-government-work.html. 
 44. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381. 
 45. Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) 
(citing Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 46. See, e.g., Bott v. Bradshaw, 791 F. App’x 41, 45 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Chavez-
Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 711 (10th Cir. 2010) (using a banquet hall as the 
physical setting). 
 47. This language again appears to rely upon a distinction between an employee’s ‘ordinary’ 
as opposed to ‘extraordinary,’ unusual, or ad hoc duties.  One might imagine that some unusual job 
duties could also be genuine, bona fide duties.  See, e.g., Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 
456, 465 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 
2007)). 
 48. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014); see also Henderson v. City of Flint, 751 F. 
App’x 618, 623 (6th Cir. 2018); Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463; Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire Dep’t, 
409 P.3d 160, 174 (Wash. 2018). 
 49. See authorities cited supra note 48. 
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verbally address, to their superiors, speech on one or more of their other job 
responsibilities.50  Worse, a government employer might, even in good faith, 
require all employees to bring all job-related concerns first to internal agency 
personnel.51 
A further single-factor approach seeks to determine whether the employee 
speech was “part and parcel”52 of the speaker’s “daily responsibilities,”53 or 
expressing the “employee’s concern about his ability to ‘properly execute his 
duties.’”54  How much the phrase ‘part and parcel’ clarifies the scope of an 
employee’s job responsibilities, or their ordinary job responsibilities, is unclear.  
One might also wonder, more fundamentally, whether expressing one’s 
concerns about one’s ability to execute one’s overall job responsibilities will 
always fall within one’s job responsibilities.55 
Often, courts inquire as well into whether the government employee’s speech 
was undertaken “pursuant to”56 some version of the employee’s job 
responsibilities.  Similarly, courts ask whether the speech in question “owes its 
existence to”57 the relevant job responsibilities.  The latter formulation is of 
special interest as a clear source of problems. 
 
 50. Imagine, for example, a variation on Connick in which a government employer required 
or encouraged employee feedback regarding one or more aspects of the employee’s work.  See also 
Weisbarth, 494 F.3d at 542 (involving a mandatory employee interview with a hired consultant re 
workplace morale). 
 51. The potential for abuse therein should be clear. 
 52. The vague metaphor of being ‘part and parcel’ normally refers to some standard feature 
that cannot be avoided within the scope of some specified activity.  See Be Part and Parcel of Sth, 
CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/be-part-
and-parcel-of-sth?q=be-part-and-parcel (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).  This phrase apparently peaked 
in the year 1840, with a stable usage rate from 1860 to the present day.  See the results at 
https://books.google.com/ngrams (enter “part and parcel” into the search bar). 
 53. Waronker v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 788 F. App’x 788, 792 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(relying on Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 398 (2d Cir. 2018)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 54. Groenewold v. Kelley, 888 F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lyons v. Vaught, 875 
F.3d 1168, 1174 (8th Cir. 2017)); Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 55. A logical paradox does indeed seem to be vaguely lurking here. 
 56. This language derives from Garcetti.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421(2006); 
see also Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 F.3d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 418); Waronker, 788 F. App’x at 791–92 (citing cases); Montero, 890 F.3d at 395 (citing 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1233 (W.D. 
Wash. 2020) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). 
 57. This language also derives from Garcetti. See Garcetti, 574 U.S. at 421–22; see also 
Barrow v. City of Hillview, 775 F. App’x 801, 812 (6th Cir. 2019) (unpublished opinion) (quoting 
Garcetti, 574 U.S. at 421); Groenewold, 888 F.3d at 371 (citing cases); Weisbarth v. Geauga Park 
Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 543 (6th Cir. 2007); Kennedy, 443 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (citing cases); King v. 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting Alves v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d 1149, 1162 (11th Cir. 2015)). 
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One immediate such problem is that the idea of speech ‘owing its existence’ 
to job responsibilities requires a prior judgment as to the scope of those 
responsibilities.  Judgments as to the scope of job responsibilities can be made 
narrowly or broadly.58  So the ‘owing its existence’ test itself depends on other 
potentially controversial and more basic considerations. 
Worse, the ‘owing its existence’ test leads to doubtful results.  Consider the 
problem of speech that is “in direct contravention to” the orders of the speaker’s 
supervisors.59  Such speech can causally owe its existence, in the senses of but-
for causation, or else substantial factor causation,60 to one’s job 
responsibilities.61  But to add to the analytical hopelessness, the speech at issue 
may be causally attributable as well to personal or public spirited motivations 
reflecting the speaker’s sense of the rights and duties of citizenship.62  Public-
spiritedness can be a but-for cause or a substantial causal factor in such speech.  
This will often be true of typical mixed-motive cases.63  These problems of 
causation will be especially common, and particularly acute, when the 
employee’s core job responsibilities themselves include honest and forthright 
speech to outsiders, or to the general public.64 
 
 58. See King, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1334 (quoting Alves, 804 F.3d at 1162).  Crucially, Lane 
itself recognizes that speech based on information one has acquired as a public employee, and by 
virtue of, or causally attributable to, that employment, does not invariably disqualify the speech 
from being protected as citizen-speech.  See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014). 
 59. See, e.g., Greisen v. Hanken, 925 F.3d 1097, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dahlia v. 
Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)); Lincoln v. Maketa, 880 F.3d 533, 
539 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241–42 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 60. For background, see Michael Moore, Causation in Law, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. (archived Fall 2019 ed.), https;//plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law (Oct. 3, 2019); 
Hillel J. Bavli, Counterfactual Causation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879, 885–86 (2019); Note, Rethinking 
Actual Causation in Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2164 (2017). 
 61. See Greisen, 925 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Dahlia, 725 F.3d at 1074–75); see also Lincoln, 
880 F.3d at 539 (citing Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241–42). 
 62. Consider the case of a public employee whose sole job is to report on the status of the 
town’s only water supply.  Discovering that the water source contains a deadly poison, the 
employee might well speak first to a supervisor, and then to outsiders, especially if the supervisor 
downplays the threat.  The employee’s personal desire to act as a responsible citizen could be both 
a but-for cause and a causally substantial factor for speaking both internally and externally.  This 
scenario is very loosely inspired by HENRICK IBSEN, AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE, available at 
www.gutenberg.org/files/2446/2446-h/2446.h.htm  (rev. ed. of May 1, 2019) (1882).  See Lane, 
573 U.S. at 240 (discussing the non-dispositive nature of acquiring the crucial information in the 
course of employment).  Importantly, the speaker’s role and functions as a public employee will 
normally be a necessary cause of the speech in question, but certainly not a sufficient cause of that 
speech, independent of the speaker’s prior background, values, beliefs, and attitudes toward 
citizenship in particular. 
 63. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2020); 
Haddad v. Gregg, 910 F.3d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 2018); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 443 F. 
Supp. 3d 1223, 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (“[T]he question of what speech is public vs. private 
becomes especially difficult when an essential part of the employee’s job is expression.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
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Perhaps, though, the difficulties inherent in these kinds of speech causation 
issues can be bypassed.  A number of the cases have focused instead on the idea 
of the public employee’s “chain of command.”65  Let us assume that the scope 
of a speaker’s chain of command can be identified.  A problem with then asking 
whether an employee’s speech was within or outside that chain of command is 
that the courts have divided over the weight, and indeed the relevance, of that 
consideration. 
Thus, some courts hold that speech outside the chain of command can still be 
unprotected as mere employee speech, as opposed to citizen speech.66  But 
speech outside the chain of command may well also be protected at this stage.67  
Thus, some courts treat venturing outside of, or perhaps consciously defying, 
one’s chain of command as a non-dispositive consideration.68  Other courts, 
however, reject chain of command considerations as even a relevant factor.69  In 
these cases, the proper focus is not on the speaker’s chain of command, or on 
“the recipient of the communication but on whether ‘the speech stemmed from 
and was of the type that the employee was paid to do, regardless of the exact 
role of the individual or entity to which the employee has chosen to speak.’”70 
One source of the continuing uncertainty regarding any possible relevance of 
the speaker’s chain of command is that there are significant differences between 
one’s chain of command and the scope of one’s workplace.  Certainly, not 
everyone at one’s workplace is anywhere in one’s chain of command.71  And 
one’s chain of command may extend far beyond the geography of one’s 
 
 65. See, e.g., Mogard v. City of Millbank, 932 F.3d 1184, 1190 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Under 
Garcetti, a public employee speaks without First Amendment protection when he reports conduct 
that interferes with his job responsibilities, even if the report is made outside his chain of 
command”) (quoting Lyons v. Vaught, 875 F.3d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir. 2017))); see also Bradley v. 
W. Chester Univ. of the Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 653, 653 n.50, 51 (3d Cir. 
2018) (citing contrasting approaches to speech deemed within or else outside the speaker’s chain 
of command). 
 66. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 65. 
 67. See, e.g., Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 715 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[The public employee’s] decision to ignore 
the normal chain of command . . . is a significant distinction.  We conclude that [the] speech is not 
left unprotected.”); Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether or not 
the employee confined his communications to his chain of command is a relevant, if not necessarily 
dispositive, factor in determining whether he spoke pursuant to his official duties.”); Thomas v. 
City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1325 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 68. See authorities cited supra note 67. 
 69. See, e.g., Trimble v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 728 F. App’x 789, 795 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(unpublished opinion) (citing Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 747 (10th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Presumably, many of the people at one’s government workplace are neither one’s own 
supervisors nor one’s subordinates. 
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workplace.72  As well, we can easily imagine a public employee alienating a 
direct supervisor by political speech having nothing to do with any employment-
related matter.73  This could be true even of confidential advisors or 
policymakers.74 
So even if the distinction between speech within and outside of one’s chain of 
command is deemed relevant, any such classification may, depending upon the 
local federal circuit court’s perspective, point in any direction.75  But this 
problem does not seem resolvable, in any stable way, within Garcetti’s threshold 
distinction between public employee speech and public-spirited citizen speech.76  
As it stands, this distinction invites, even as it seeks to discourage, a government 
employer’s strategically expanding an employee job description and 
responsibilities.77   The Garcetti speaker-role test can itself then be modified, 
consciously or unconsciously, by judicial interpretation. 
Consider, for example, a subtle, but potentially significant, expansion of the 
scope of unprotected speech.  Some courts have said that “if an employee 
engages in speech during the course of performing an official duty and the 
speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the employee’s performance of 
the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the employee’s official 
duties.”78 
Now, this language may seem entirely in keeping with sound public policy 
and respect for freedom of speech.  But consider that many job performances 
involving speech may be genuinely furthered by merely introductory, apparently 
digressive, or mere leave-taking speech not itself addressing the job-
performance subject at issue.  People do not always converse most effectively 
through rigorously ordered bullet-points.  The overall job-focused conversation 
 
 72. For example, a local postmaster in Portland, Oregon may have an effective chain of 
command that ends in the White House.  See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) 
(reviewing presidential removal cases). 
 73. Consider, for example, a variation on the circumstances in Rankin v. McPherson.  See 
generally Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (intending speech for a particular co-worker 
rather than for any supervisor). 
 74. Imagine, for example, a confidential or policy-making federal employee who comments 
to a supervisor about a controversial state election race, particularly where that federal agency does 
not typically interface with the state office in question. 
 75. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (objecting to any public employer’s 
attempt to game the Garcetti threshold test, and thereby successfully punish the employee, “by 
creating excessively broad job descriptions”); see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 
634, 636 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the denial of certiorari based on Garcetti) 
(quoting Garcetti, 574 U.S. at 424)). 
 78. Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 713 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis 
added). 
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may be enhanced by what amount to non-linear conversational digressions, 
polite references, and asides.79 
Relatedly, some courts have interpreted Garcetti to allow consideration of 
whether the relevant speech or course of conduct was “intended . . . to serve any 
purpose of the employer.”80  Again, this interpretation seems entirely reasonable 
on its face.  But consider that beyond its own distinctive functions, government 
agencies typically have broader purposes as well.  Among these further purposes 
may be that of providing competent service that is free of gross corruption or 
inefficiency, and furthering the values of governmental transparency and 
accountability in a responsive democracy.81 
These would certainly be worthy agency goals and purposes,82 whatever their 
priority for the agency.  The problem, though, is that much classic whistle-
blower speech is intended to serve two kinds of purposes.  Such speech is often 
intended by the speaker to address a serious public policy problem, uttered in 
whatever forum, but the speech is also intended by the speaker to address job-
focused questions of competence, corruption, inefficiency, transparency, or 
public accountability.83  Literally, then, whatever the venue or context of such 
speech, it would also be intended to promote an agency purpose84 and thus be 
unprotected as employee speech.85 
Finally, then, and most fundamentally, the Garcetti speaker-role test clearly 
generates legal results that are often contrary to the intuitions and common sense 
of the public, the government agency, and the employee-speaker.  The Garcetti 
speaker-role test generates results, on its own logic, that turn out to be ironic, 
counterintuitive, or paradoxical to a reasonable observer. 
Consider, for example, the situation described by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch in 
a case86 that was initially briefed before the decision in Garcetti, but in which 
the parties then later discussed the implications of Garcetti.87  Understandably, 
the employee speaker and the government employer essentially had to switch 
sides post-Garcetti.88  The government employer had initially argued, sensibly, 
that the employee had spoken without any authority to do so.89  The speaker, 
 
 79. On the other hand, government employees should not be permitted to insulate their verbal 
sabotage or dereliction by gratuitously inserting irrelevant, or largely irrelevant, controversial 
political speech. 
 80. Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson 
v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 596 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 81. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra text at note 80. 
 83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 86. Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 87. See id. at 1329–30. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 1329. 
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equally sensibly, had initially argued pre-Garcetti that her job responsibilities 
required her to report alleged agency misdeeds to federal authorities.90 
Ironically, after Garcetti, both parties found it expedient to switch their major 
themes.91  The employer argued in a reply brief that the speech was engaged in 
pursuant to the speaker’s official job title and responsibilities.92  The speaker, 
with equal irony, then argued that her reporting of official violations was 
undertaken “solely in her capacity as a citizen, not as an employee.”93 
No doubt it is perfectly ordinary for parties to tailor their litigating positions 
to the language of new binding authorities.  But Garcetti required, in this 
instance, objectively humiliating complete reversals of the parties’ basic 
analyses.  In large measure, the Garcetti inquiry into speaker-role stands 
common sense, and basic intuitions, on their respective heads. 
In another case, the government employer had hired a consultant to obtain 
employee opinions.94  The employee-speaker argued that her honest 
conversation with this consultant, hired precisely to undertake job-related 
interviews with the employees, was for this reason protected speech.95  But 
however common-sensical this line of reasoning might be, it ironically 
undermines the speaker’s case, at the speaker-role threshold, under Garcetti.96  
The speech at issue “owe[d] its existence”97 to the speaker’s job 
responsibilities.98  The court summarized the overall posture of the case in these 
terms: “The fact that [the employee-speaker] was allegedly fired for voicing her 
concerns over departmental morale and performance issues when explicitly 
asked to do so by an agent of the [employer] thus tends to make [the employer’s] 
action more constitutionally defensible in this instance, albeit also more difficult 
to understand.”99  The inquiry under Garcetti into speaker-role status thus 
depends upon setting common-sense intuitions aside.  The sense of anti-
intuitiveness, irony, and paradox pervades this employee-role versus citizen-role 
inquiry.  Most administrative malfeasance will be known by other administrative 
actors only pursuant to their status and role as a government employee.100  Quite 
naturally, government employee speakers often refer to or emphasize, in their 
 
 90. See id. at 1330. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 95. See id. at 543. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. at 544.  But see supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 544. 
 99. Id. at 545.  The court then rightly drew the further inference that these circumstances 
essentially ruled out the speaker’s case under Garcetti.  See id. 
 100. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1324 (10th Cir. 2008) (“He was 
aware that the certificate . . . was fraudulent only because of his official duty as a housing 
inspector.”). 
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public speech, their employee status.  This is quite understandably done in order 
to explain the situation, and to establish some credibility before a public 
audience of outsiders.101 
Additionally, the Garcetti speaker-role inquiry may incentivize some forms 
of what might be seen as employee insubordination.102  Even job descriptions 
adopted in good faith, and not unduly expanded by employers, can be 
remarkably unclear in their moral and civic implications.103  And finally, the 
Garcetti test also provides legal incentive, often perversely, for conscientious 
public employees to first take their concerns to outsiders, rather than to obtain 
any internal agency responses first.104  Speaking first to the outside public, 
though, does not ensure that one will be held to have spoken as a citizen.105  But 
speaking first to one’s supervisors, as common sense might suggest, 
unfortunately minimizes one’s free speech rights under Garcetti.106 
II. HOW THE GARCETTI TEST GOES WRONG: CONCEPTIONS OF BUREAUCRATS, 
CITIZENS, DEMOCRACY, AND MEANINGFUL FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Diagnosing Garcetti’s basic error requires examining the opinion’s 
underlying assumptions.  The essence of Garcetti lies in its initial attempted 
distinction between speaker roles.  Garcetti relies on some sort of rough 
dichotomy between a person’s speech in their role as a public employee, and 
their speech, perhaps identical in content, as a citizen.107  No doubt, the law often 
benefits from simple binary distinctions.  There is certainly something to 
Garcetti’s binary speaker role classification.  But as it turns out, the Garcetti 
binary unfortunately validates one particular understanding of what it is like to 
be a government employee, at the expense of another, and perhaps worthier, 
 
 101. See, e.g., Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Haddad v. Gregg, 
910 F.3d 237, 248 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[H]e had extensive knowledge of the issues on which he 
spoke—knowledge based on his employment and unique knowledge gleaned from his position.”). 
 102. This was loosely suggested by facts akin to those in Dahlia v. Rodriguez.  See Dahlia v. 
Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a public employee speaks in direct 
contravention to his supervisor’s orders, that speech may often fall outside of the speaker’s 
professional duties.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 939 F.3d 732, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that 
an agency fiscal management officer is under no duty as an employee to report general internal 
agency ethical violations or allegations of discrimination); Javitz v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 940 F.3d 
858, 866–67 (3d Cir. 2019) (reporting a crime detected within one’s ‘ordinary’ job duties was not 
itself also within the scope of one’s ‘ordinary’ job duties, despite a county ethics code encouraging 
such reporting). 
 104. Consider, for example, the circumstances outlined in Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 
F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 2019). See Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(speaking in one capacity or another, as public employee or as citizen, to community leaders). This 
parenthetical seems very vague to me. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 1190 (noting the implications of speaking within one’s chain of command under 
Garcetti). 
 107. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
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understanding.  For many speakers, the Garcetti binary requires a self-
alienation, or an artificial, indeed arbitrary, splitting of the integrated self. 
The origins of the Court’s analytical division of the self actually predate 
Garcetti.  Even as early as 1968, the Court impliedly distinguished speakers in 
their roles as citizens, with interests in commenting on matters of public concern, 
from speakers in their roles as public employees.108  This distinction between a 
person’s supposedly separate speaker roles is implied as well in successive cases 
down to the present.109  Only when the speaker is somehow deemed to have 
spoken in their role as a citizen rather than as a public employee, is further 
constitutional analysis the required. 110 
The next step under Garcetti, and the first step under prior cases111 is that of 
determining whether the citizen-speech in question addressed a subject of public 
interest or concern.112  Such a subject would be distinct from a personal or 
private concern.113  That particular determination has been judicially made by 
reference to as many as seven distinct factors.114  One or more of these factors 
seem open to manipulation by the government employer after the speech has 
already been made.115  At present, the appellate courts are split on whether the 
 
 108. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 109. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675–76 (1996); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006); Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 
299 (2007); Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2014).  More recently, see, e.g., Henry v. 
Johnson, 950 F.3d 1005, 1011–12 (8th Cir. 2020); Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 
753 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 110. See supra Section I. 
 111. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  The Court has recognized that public 
employees, in their supposedly distinct role and capacity as citizens, may make truthful or well-
grounded assertions relating not to mere personal grievances, but to matters of genuine public 
interest, on which the speaker may bring special expertise.  See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 
U.S. 77, 82 (2004).  The “interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed 
opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.”  Id.  In fact, it is the public’s interest in 
responsive, effective, efficient government, as inseparably linked with the openness and 
transparency promoted by appropriate employee speech rights, that should predominate.  The 
protection-worthiness of speech on matters of public interest then depends upon an interest 
balancing test under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. of 205.  Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 568.  Too often, the courts narrow down the government’s interest into mere institutional or 
operational efficiency, thus underplaying the government’s own presumed interest, along with that 
of the public, in its own appropriate democratic responsiveness.  See Roe, 543 U.S. at 82; Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 568 (focusing narrowly on governmental efficiency). 
 113. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  Courts normally fail to consider, in a 
close case, whether the employee could have easily, cheaply, and authentically reformulated their 
speech so as to more clearly implicate the public interest.  See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters 
of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 27 (1987). 
 114. See, e.g., Harnishfeger v. United States, 943 F.3d 1105, 1115 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 796 (7th Cir. 2016)). 
 115. See id.  In particular, employee morale and some forms of alleged workplace disruption 
can be strategically manipulated by the employer after the speech in question. 
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government must show at least some degree of actual speech-caused 
disruption,116 or whether some likely disruption of some degree can suffice.117 
The case law thus relies fundamentally on a particular understanding of what 
motivates a government employee.  For purposes of Garcetti’s speaker-role 
distinction, a government employee is presumed to resemble what we might call 
neutrally a bureaucrat, at one level or another, rather than what we might call, in 
contrast, a person who is more motivated, in the moment, by that person’s 
citizenship or public service values. 
Certainly, there is much support in the social science literature for thinking of 
public employees as in general tending more toward the “bureaucratic” end of 
the motivational spectrum.118  But at the time of any given speech and more 
broadly, some government employees instead place greater value on a “[d]esire 
to serve the public interest,”119 on being “loyal to society as a whole,”120 and on 
“loyalty . . . to the ‘general welfare’ as they see it”121 
Government employees who are more motivated by broad public service 
values follow some version of what we might call Confucian,122 Greek 
democratic,123 or classical Roman124 ideals of the worthy public employee.  
Thus, for example, Cicero in particular argues that qualified persons “should 
renounce all hesitation, seek entry to public office, and administer the state.  In 
no other way can a city-state be governed, or greatness of spirit made 
 
 116. See, e.g., Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 715–16 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 117. See, e.g., Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 685–87 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing supporting cases 
from other circuits). 
 118. See, e.g., EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER 88–89 (2012) (describing 
bureaucrats as seeking “to maximise their personal ambitions.  They may well seek to do a good 
job and to serve the public diligently; but like the rest of us, they also seek income, wealth, ease, 
tenure, seniority, leisure and comfort; and in their case, perhaps discretionary power and deference 
too”); GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A 
PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 55–62 (2002); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 84 
(1967) (recognizing bureaucratic motivational roles of seeking power, income, prestige, leisure, 
personal or programmatic loyalty, and pride in technical competence). 
 119. Downs, supra note 118, at 84. 
 120. Id. at 88. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS BOOK 20, § 2, at 81 (Raymond Dawson trans., 
2008) (~500 BCE) (“Zizhang asked Master Kong: ‘What sort of person must one be so that one 
may take part in government?’ ‘If one honours the five excellences and puts away the four 
abominations, one may take part in government,’ said the Master.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Thucydides, Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN 
WAR: BOOK II, 143, 147 (Rex Warner trans., 1954) (reprint ed., 1984) (~400 BCE) (emphasizing 
the Athenian pride in public-spirited participation in the affairs of state); see also Melissa Lane, 
The Idea of Accountable Office in Ancient Greece and Beyond, 95 PHIL. 19, 20 (2020) (referring 
to Athenian accountability procedures for “misuse of . . . powers”). 
 124. See, e.g., CICERO, ON OBLIGATIONS 26 (P.G. Walsh trans., 2000) (~44 BCE); MARCUS 
TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 126 (George Holland Sabine & Stanley Barney Smith 
trans., 1929) (reprint ed.) (~44 BCE). 
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manifest.”125  And Cicero’s dialogic character Laelius declares that “service to 
the state I consider the most glorious function of the wise and the chief mark or 
duty of the good.”126 
In our own cultural context, exposing administrative pathologies, including 
misfeasance and corruption,127 often depends on speech by insiders.  This sort 
of speech, where it is reasonably well-grounded128 and not protected by whistle 
blower statutes,129 is essential to a responsive and accountable representative 
democracy. 
Democracy in particular, among other possible governmental systems, is 
crucially dependent upon appropriate degrees of bureaucratic openness, 
transparency, and accountability.130  Thus, David Heald has argued that 
transparency allows the ‘ruled’ to observe the actual conduct and behavior of the 
 
 125. CICERO, ON OBLIGATIONS, supra note 124, Book I, § 74, at 26. 
 126. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH supra note 124, Book I, § XX, at 
126. 
 127. Hannah Arendt argues that unless they are properly monitored, bureaucrats may promote 
a system in which “neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible.”  
HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 137 (1972).  Of late, “the public views the federal 
government as a chronically clumsy, ineffectual, bloated giant that cannot be counted upon to do 
the right thing, much less to do it well.  It does not seem to matter much to them whether the 
government that fails them is liberal or conservative.” PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT 
FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 4 (2014).  U.S. rankings among other nations have 
also recently fallen as to “voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
and control of corruption.”  Id. at 12; see also NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEGENERATION: 
HOW INSTITUTIONS DECAY AND ECONOMIES DIE 100–03 (reprint ed. 2014); Niall Ferguson, 
Whither American Exceptionalism?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN A NEW ERA 71, 84 
(Thomas W. Gilligan ed., 2017) www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/amerex_ch7.pdf 
at 84.  For elaborations of typical bureaucratic pathologies, many but not all of which can be 
addressed through greater protection of responsible government employee speech, see authorities 
cited supra note 118.  On government corruption in particular, see BRIAN W. HOGWOOD & B. GUY 
PETERS, THE PATHOLOGY OF PUBLIC POLICY 142–45 (1985) (emphasizing the cost and 
disadvantages of institutional, bureaucratic measures that are intended to reduce bureaucratic 
corruption); Jordan Gans-Moore, et al., Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on What Works, 105 WORLD DEV. 171, 171 (2018) (finding separate anti-corruption 
agencies as an ineffective approach); Ting Gong & Sunny L. Yang, Controlling Bureaucratic 
Corruption, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIAS (June 25, 2019), https://oxfordre.com/ 
politics/view/10.1093 (discussing corruption as undermining regime legitimacy). 
 128. Insider government employee speech would be of no special value only if all government 
agencies were utterly open and transparent in all their operations, which is neither possible nor 
desirable at all stages of the decision-making process.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF 
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 180–81 (2007). 
 129. The main, however remarkably practically limited, federal statute is the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9).  At the state level, see the latest compilation by 
the National Whistleblower Center.  NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., www.whistleblowers.org (last 
visited Oct. 20. 2020). 
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‘rulers,’ with democratic regimes relying in particular on transparency in order 
to promote democratic accountability.131 
More elaborately, Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that 
 [i]n a democratic polity, the hinge that connects accountability and 
deliberation is transparency.  Transparency in and of itself is plausibly 
a democratic virtue.  Citizens who are entitled to at least an indirect 
share in the making of the laws, and who will be bound by the laws, 
should also be able to observe their delegated representative-
lawmakers at work.132 
Professor Vermeule’s logic actually extends beyond legislators in particular 
to bureaucratic policy-making and decision-making, and the examples he refers 
to are matters largely of bureaucratic decision-making.133  Professor Vermeule 
concludes that “[w]hatever the intrinsic weight of transparency as a democratic 
good, . . . it is certainly an indispensable institutional precondition to the 
achievement of other democratic goals.”134 
The relationship between bureaucratic openness and accountability on the one 
hand and the health of democracy on the other has long been recognized.135  
Crucially, effective public monitoring136 of the workings of administrative 
agencies, as distinct from merely their formal output,137 is necessary for 
meaningful democracy.  The democratic public clearly has a right to seek out 
and select from diverse non-official sources of public information.138 
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officials, and the ‘sovereign,’ in the sense of the people expressing their common interests); ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1850) (“I can 
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Public access to diverse voices, including those of experts, is thus crucial to 
meaningful democracy.139  Access to such voices, including those of experts 
inside, as well as outside, governmental bureaucracies requires a regime of 
meaningfully free speech.  As John Rawls has argued, “to restrict or suppress 
free political speech . . . always implies a partial suspension of democracy.”140  
Professor Ronald Dworkin similarly argues that democratic popular sovereignty 
requires “that the people rather than the officials be masters.”141  Popular 
sovereignty in this sense then indispensably requires variously sourced freedom 
of speech that is critical of government actors.142 
A democratically responsible government thus requires meaningful freedom 
for speech that is critical of government officials, practices, and policies.143  The 
Supreme Court itself has at least acknowledged this very function.144  Now, it is 
also true that many writers have emphasized other sorts of free speech purposes 
or functions.145  Probably the main approaches to the value of free speech other 
than promoting democracy are those that emphasize, respectively, either the 
pursuit of truth,146 or the value of personal growth and meaningful autonomy.147  
In a sense, these are rival approaches to the value of freedom of speech.  But the 
deeper truth, at least for own concerns, is that views emphasizing the pursuit of 
truth and autonomous self-realization are important complements to a focus on 
promoting democracy as a free speech purpose. 
 
Possibilities of Democracy, 20 THEORY & SOC’Y 875, 883 (1991) (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY, AND ITS CRITICS 233 (1989)). 
 139. See authorities cited supra note 138. 
 140. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 354 (rev. ed. 2005). 
 141. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 363 
(2000). 
 142. See id. at 365, 367, 369. 
 143. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 
1097, 1102–03 (2016); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 
477, 482, 488–89 (2011) (“[T]he best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment 
doctrine is the value of democratic self-government.”) (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN 
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY app. 
I, at 472–77, 486–90 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992).  A similar judgment is offered by James 
Weinstein.  See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491 (2011); see also Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and 
the Argument From Democracy, 25 NOMOS: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 241, 247 (1983) (citing 
Alexander Meiklejohn) (emphasizing the principle that “all relevant information is made available 
to the sovereign electorate”). 
 144. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[Speech] concerning public 
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”) (quoting Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). 
 145. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 119 
(1989). 
 146. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 4, 22-23, 25-27, 30-32 (1995). 
 147. See, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.-R. – 
C.L. L. REV. 443, 500–01, 503 (1998). 
366 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70:347 
In our context, pursuing the truth about government bureaucratic operations, 
and the truth about the real costs and benefits of government programs, is 
inherently part of meaningful democratic accountability.  The pursuit of truth 
and meaningful democracy are thus crucially inseparable.148  And no less 
separable are democracy and the pursuit of autonomous self-realization, 
understood as the “the most conducive environment for human flourishing.”149  
Nor need there be any serious conflict when both the pursuit of truth and concern 
for self-realization and autonomy are jointly linked to the pursuit of democratic 
self-government.150 
III. CONCLUSION 
The current law of public employee speech rights amounts to a near-perfect 
storm of jurisprudential undesirability.  The Supreme Court’s imposition of a 
gate-keeping requirement that the speech has been made in one’s role as citizen, 
and not in one’s role as a government employee, has led to disturbing, and 
specifically, democracy-undermining results.  The case law manages to combine 
murkiness with adverse impacts on the public accountability, openness, and 
transparency essential for genuine democracy.  The cases commonly display 
ironic, paradoxical, deeply incongruous, and broadly counterintuitive reasoning 
and results.  These outcomes indicate that the Court should revise its current 
approach to public employee speech so as to better protect democratic values. 
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